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QUESTIONING A NEOLIBERAL URBAN REGENERATION POLICY:  
THE RHETORIC OF “CITIES OF CULTURE” AND THE CITY OF GWANGJU, KOREA 
 




The present study traces recent trends in cultural policy concerning “cities of culture” in 
South Korea. The paper is a case study of the city of Gwangju, known as the birthplace of 
modern democracy in Korea. Currently, public input from below into the urban 
regeneration project for Gwangju is almost nonexistent, while most urban regeneration 
policies have been implemented from the top by elites who enjoy exhibiting their 
performances through constructing massive edifices rather than encouraging the 
preservation of such intangibles as historical significance through cultural participation 
from below. The government’s policy of promoting Gwangju as the “city of culture” in 
order to make it a hub of Asian cultural industry and tourism in the global economy is 
closely allied to its policy of economic reductionism of culture. The study suggests that 
Gwangju and its unique heritage would instead benefit from an urban regeneration policy 
aimed at establishing it as the city of art and culture for human rights and democracy and 
as part of a collaborative network with the heritage initiatives of international bodies.  
 
KEYWORDS  neoliberalism; state interventionism; creative city; cultural industry; sustainable 
development; human rights 
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Introduction 
 The urban renewal programs in South Korea under the military regimes that ruled the 
country from the 1960s to the early 1990s were based entirely on economic development policies 
promoting heavy industry and new construction. Thanks to such interventionist, government-
driven policies in urban development, since the launching of the civilian government in the mid-
1990s, South Korea, and especially the city of Seoul—East Asia’s second-largest metropolitan 
area—has been transformed into an intermediary nodal point or hub for disseminating the global 
ideas of neoliberal urban development within the developing Asian countries.  
The present study surveys the neoliberal paradigm of economic expansion that has 
dominated policy discourses related to urban development and traces recent cultural policy 
concerning “cities of culture” in South Korea. Since 2004, the Korean government and its 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism have implemented a cultural policy of renovating several mid-
sized cities such as Gwangju, Kyongju, and Jeonju as “international cultural cities.” This policy 
of designating Korea’s larger cities as niches of Asian cultural industry and tourism in the global 
economy is closely related to the government’s economic reductionism of culture. Heedless of 
the cultural diversity, social conditions, and local traditions in a given city, the government has 
aimed at gaining market share by transforming traditional culture into profitable show business 
ventures. The present paper is a case study of the city of Gwangju, which is known as the 
“birthplace of democracy” in Korea because of the massacre of striking workers, protesting 
students, and citizens that occurred there on May 18, 1980. The present study investigates how 
the historic city of Gwangju, once a democratic “commune” of local citizens resisting the 
military regime of the 80s, has lost its spirit, and how the Korean government has redesigned a 
city in an attempt to make it a powerhouse in the global economy.  
Currently, the dominant market power of supranational economic institutions has entirely 
subordinated Korean IT and cultural policies to the global economic order. The effect of the 
uncritical appropriation of neoliberal discourses about globalization in urban renewal policies 
has been to replace local geographical, cultural, social, and environmental conditions in a city 
with a geometrical grid of economic reductionism. Instead of improving urban life, the rhetoric 
of development usually leads to gentrification, commercialization, and the reduction of the 
cultural and the local to the economic (McGuigan 2004, p. 98). When the rapid privatization and 
commercialization of cultural landscapes and resources is the collaborative work of proprietary 
Urban Regeneration in Gwangju, Korea 2 
desire and government support, the role of the government in building the public commons for 
citizens is suspect. The incorporation of Korean IT and cultural policies into a new imperial 
mode of production—the so-called “knowledge-based economic system”—is an abdication of 
the normative role of the state as a public mediator guaranteeing the cultural rights of the citizen 
and defending citizens’ common intellectual heritage against overly narrow marketism.  
The present study first examines the current neoliberal logic of economic reductionism of 
culture and how local cities in the process of neoliberal urbanization have been entirely 
subordinated to policy discourses of the cultural or creative industry. The study then looks at the 
historical value of Gwangju for Korea and East Asia and at the cultural policies driven by 
entrepreneurial urban management which have been implemented for Gwangju. The study next 
explores how the current Korean policy drive to create “cities of culture” is being catalyzed by 
market initiatives. Finally, this study recommends that if the government wants to address the 
historic pain of an oppressed region, it should embark on a different urban project, both by 
designating Gwangju as an international sanctum of human rights resistance to authoritarian 
regimes and by connecting with the cultural initiatives of international bodies such as the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which could situate 
Gwangju’s unique human rights heritage within one of its cultural heritage projects.  
 
Neoliberal Urbanization of Local Cities   
Cities have always included spatial vocabularies of power: there is an uneven geography 
of segregations, disparities, and exclusions between downtown and ghettos or slums, between 
urban and rural, between local and global, between center and periphery, and so on. For instance, 
“fortified” or “carceral” cities (Davis 1990; Soja 1996) are terms reflecting a new stage of 
deregulatory social control, one that involves policing urban space through pervasive and 
ubiquitous mobility. The “dual city” (Castells 1999), the “de-industrialized city” (Lash & Urry 
1994, pp. 151–153), and the “polarized city” (Short 2004) are all terms depicting the uneven 
development of cities within the networks of global economies. Either local and regional cities 
are subordinated to serve as intermediaries transfusing their material and immaterial assets into 
major global cities, or they are excluded and disconnected from the “control points for the 
reproduction of capitalist society in terms of labor power, exchange, and consumption patterns” 
(Soja 1989, p. 95).  
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From the early 1980s onwards, a huge trend in the global age of neoliberalism has been a 
new entrepreneurial urbanization in particular localized settings. Neoliberalism goes beyond the 
classical claims of the laissez-faire market operated by the “invisible hand” and represents 
instead a pervasive drive to reconfigure society entirely by national and international business 
powers. In the neoliberal phase of capitalism, the scope of market commodities is extended to the 
private appropriation of tangible or intangible cultural forms and intellectual creativity as new 
profit sources for capitalism and to the legitimating of this process through the legal system that 
defends intellectual property rights such as copyright, trademark, and patent. Once disregarded 
as a profit source, the material and immaterial cultural assets of local cities are increasingly seen 
as key resources for creating the new productive value chain of the cultural industry. Local cities 
have gradually become “strategically crucial arenas for neoliberal forms of policy 
experimentation and institutional restructuring” (Brenner & Theodore 2002, p. 357). The spatial 
reconfiguration weaving together the global–local nexus within specific regional and local places 
implies the major trends of urban entrepreneurialism: that of the “creative city” projects, which 
are directed toward exploiting cultural resources for local economic development, and that of the 
“techno-city” projects, which aim to create ideal future cities incorporating digital technology 
and communication networks in leading advanced IT countries.  
These high-tech and market-driven models of urban renewal reflect the changing mode of 
profitable resources in capitalism, which is creating a new value productive chain from the 
privatization of cultural assets in local and regional cities. Harvey (2005, pp. 101–108) describes 
some of the political and territorial logics of neoliberalism, such as capturing local and             
regional dynamics as a source of capitalist power and augmenting that power by setting up 
havens for capital investment such as constructing new high-tech industrial districts, designating 
special districts for tourism, and granting privileged loans for real estate speculation in local 
economies. Moreover, as shown in a study of thirteen large-scale urban development projects in 
European Union countries (Swyngedouw et al. 2002), the policy processes of urban development 
in targeted cities are characterized by “less democratic and more elite-driven priorities” (p. 542). 
The new urban renewal projects are “the material expression of a developmental logic that views 
megaprojects and place-marketing as means for generating future growth and for waging a 
competitive struggle to attract investment capital” (p. 546).   
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The “creative city” discourse has also made its way to the center of cultural policy 
debates, as well as of urban renewal policy issues. Landry (2000, p. xii) describes the “creative 
city” as a new “method of strategic urban planning” by reinventing the city as a “vibrant hub of 
creativity, potential and improving quality of life.” Florida (2002, pp. 244–266) emphasizes a 
“creativity index” used for the purpose of reviving regional growth that includes a high-
technology indicator and a cultural resource indicator which mainly consists of a diversity index 
measuring such factors as the proportion of gay population, bohemian culture, and nontraditional 
lifestyle found in a specific region.  
This idealistic appeal to the innovative and creative index of cities, however, ignores how 
such rhetoric is co-opted by market-driven policies that lead to spatial disparity and segregation 
of populations by social class which degrade the urban landscape. The new policy discourses of 
entrepreneurial urban management ignore such realistic aspects of cities as wage slavery, high 
unemployment, and alienated urban ghettos — the desolate conditions of urban life vividly 
depicted as the “unreal city” in T. S. Eliot’s The Waste Land (1922). The “creative city” 
approach presents a “sanitized” picture of urban life, passing over such realities of city life as the 
stark inequalities between urban dwellers, the dwarfing of local cultural resources by large-scale 
corporate ownership, and the elite-led processes through which such cultural policies are made 
(Chatterson 2000).  
Gwangju, one of Korea’s local cities, is an example of such neoliberal urban regeneration 
policies. Gwangju was once known as “a center of revolution against the established order” 
(Harvey 1973, p. 203); the neoliberal shift in cultural policy to economic reductionism, by 
establishing Gwangju’s topological status as a semi-peripheral hub for promoting and connecting 
global and Asian trade and cultural industry, has transformed it instead into “a center of power 
and privilege (to be revolted against)” (p. 204). Neoliberal urban policy in Gwangju thus has 
rapidly subverted insurgency and cultural diversity, stripped the natural environment from the 
local urban landscape, and commodified the local tangible and intangible heritage. In their place 
it has brought economic exploitation, cultural decay, the impoverishment of urban ghettos, 
increased traffic congestion, and the destruction of local urban ecologies by out-of-town 
developers. A city that was once a symbol of local pro-democratic political insurgency has been 
co-opted by neoliberal urban and cultural policies such as creating new incentive structures to 
reward local entrepreneurialism, constructing large-scale urban projects to attract corporate 
Urban Regeneration in Gwangju, Korea 5 
investment, and repositioning the city within supranational capital flows, while excluding the 
underprivileged from the processes of cultural policy-making. 
In sum, the new entrepreneurial approach to cultural policy is pervasive in large-scale 
urban regeneration projects of for local cities throughout the world, and this approach effaces 
local cultural heritage and historical memory in the name of local economic development. The 
Korean government’s cultural policy has embraced the neoliberal economic reductionism of 
culture, to the diminution of Gwangju’s significance as a shrine to human rights.   
 
 The Economic Reductionism of Korea’s Urban Regeneration 
Although cultural policy is a kind of “balancing act” between competing visions of the 
role of culture in society (e.g., Matarasso & Landry 1999), the Korean government has taken a 
major role in the neoliberal rearrangement of urban spaces and Korean cultural policy is largely 
market-driven. The spatial redesign of the modern Korean city has been entirely conditioned by 
the strong alliance between state interventionism and neoliberal economic reductionism, along 
with a conscious desire to be brought under the umbrella of the globalized economy of cultural 
industry. Harvey (2003) describes how the active role of the state releases a set of public assets 
through deregulation, privatization, financial liberalization, and the commercialization of cultural 
and historical assets that were once in the public domain. To optimize conditions for capital 
accumulation, a market-friendly public policy is essential to the neoliberal state system, and this 
consequently causes cutbacks in welfare provision, healthcare, public education, and core social 
services, while at the same time providing market incentives in the form of tax breaks, the 
creation of infrastructure at state expense, and the opening of local markets known as “structural 
adjustment” to global forces (Harvey 2006, pp. 23–26). The state-driven urban development 
policies of East and Southeast Asia, such as those of Singapore, Taiwan, and Korea, are 
examples of state interventionism and the economic growth it can create. In Korea, the spatial 
appropriation by capital and the state is currently being vitalized by a new state-generated 
rhetoric directed at persuading citizens to legitimize it by cooperating with a “cities of culture” 
policy project, a version of “creative city” projects elsewhere. 
In Korea, since 1973 when the military regime established the first master plan for 
cultural development, the title of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism has changed several times, 
responding to the policy focus of each administration: the Ministry of Culture and Information 
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(1973–89), the Ministry of Culture (1990–92), the Ministry of Culture and Sports (1993–97), and 
finally, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (1998–the present). The concept of “cultural 
welfare” which the government had officially supported since the 1970s was rapidly transformed 
under the civilian regimes of the 1990s into the neoliberal policy agenda of promoting the 
domestic cultural industry and tourism, especially since 1998 when Dae-jung Kim, once a 
prominent political activist, became president. The IMF-driven financial crisis of 1997 in Korea 
meant that the Kim administration which took office in 1998 inherited the heavy political burden 
of attempting to restructure the domestic market so as to allow it to become vulnerable to the 
pressure of global conglomerates. While Kim had advocated a democratic reform of the old 
authoritarian regime, under the conditions of increasing globalization his policy shifted to the 
radical adoption of neoliberal economic policies and to promoting the information and culture 
industries over the labor-intensive heavy industries. Because of Kim’s success in enacting 
political reform, opposition to his administration’s economic drive toward privatization and 
commercialization was muted (Cho 2000, p. 422). Since that time, culture has been widely 
regarded both as a key dimension of economic globalization and as a creative industry for 
earning foreign dollars and creating a new job market.  
Throughout the administration of Dae-jung Kim and that of the current president, Moo-
hyun Noh, policy plans for the cultural or creative industry have been so driven by economic 
reductionism of culture that voices advocating cultural diversity have been drowned out by a 
vague rhetoric of “international competition” (Amin 1998, p. 46). Bourdieu’s (2003) critique of 
“the policy of depoliticization” is quite apt for describing current cultural policy in Korea. 
Bourdieu pinpoints exactly the destructive aspect of the emergent neoliberal policy, which aims 
to “grant economic determinisms a fatal stranglehold by ‘liberating’ them from all controls, and 
to obtain the submission of citizens and governments to the economic” (p. 38).  
 Since the establishment of a Committee for Planning the Cities of Culture by presidential 
order (No. 18279) in February 2004, Korea’s major cities, such as Gwangju, Busan, Incheon, 
Kyongju, and Jeonju, have been strategically designated “cities of culture”  in order to promote 
the creative industries in response to global market demands. Kyongju (designated the “city of 
history”) and Jeonju (the “city of tradition”) are being promoted for tourism as having an ancient 
historical tradition and cultural heritage, while larger cities such as Gwangju (the “city of 
culture”), Incheon (the “city of entertainment”), and Busan (the “city of visual media”) have 
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been designated as “creative cities”; all these cities have been placed under the direct supervision 
of the national government and its Ministry of Culture and Tourism. The concept of “creative 
cities” means adjusting local urban spaces to make them function within a global framework 
(e.g., Tay 2005), and the Korean “cities of culture” are versions of the “creative cities” that 
cultural policy theorists and urban geographers have described as being created through the 
cultural globalization promoted by local and central government policy initiatives. The Korean 
government’s “city of culture” project in Gwangju, however, involves more state intervention 
than is used in other Korean cities. Before investigating why the current Noh government is so 
deeply involved in the urban policy of Gwangju, this study gives an overview of the democratic 
history of Gwangju and the living conditions of its citizens.  
 
 The Unique Role of Gwangju in Korean History   
 Located in Cholla Province, Gwangju, which means “village of light,” is the hub of the 
southwestern (Honam) region of the Korean Peninsula and is a first-tier metropolitan city with a 
population of about 1.41 million (Korean Bureau of National Statistics 2005). From ancient 
times, the Honam region has been known for its fertile plains. Ironically, the optimal conditions 
for agriculture enabled feudal landlords to squeeze labor out of the peasant farmers in a 
miserable way for three centuries during the Chosun dynasty. Despite the people’s impoverished 
economic and social life, the region has been important in the development of art (Gwangju is 
the birthplace of namjonghwa, the southern school of Chinese painting) and music (Gwangju is a 
center of seopyungae, a form of pansori, the traditional Korean epic music-drama). The 
popularity of art and music in Gwangju suggests that it served as a cultural catharsis in the midst 
of so much exploitation by feudal overlords.  
 While the miserable conditions of the people’s life may have stimulated their artistic and 
cultural sensibilities, Gwangju’s citizens also have a long historical tradition of defending 
themselves against landlords who made the farmers suffer in abject poverty (it was the center of 
the 1894 Donghak rebellion) and against the Japanese colonial occupation (it was the location of 
the 1929 student revolt). Most importantly, the uprising of Gwangju’s citizens in May 1980 is 
remembered as marking a new era of democracy in modern Korean history. It is ironic, therefore, 
to see the historical memory of democracy and human rights be diminished by a top-down 
cultural policy decision of the national government.  
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 In South Korea up through at least the early 1990s, the grid of military-authoritarian 
practices that threatened citizens’ public rights was pervasive: for instance, the national ID 
system identifying each Korean, the use of paramilitary violence to break labor unions, the use of 
closed-circuit TV’s for policing, and the widespread practice of government eavesdropping and 
of politically-motivated investigations of activist citizens. During the 1970s and 1980s, the 
regime in power employed a wide variety of means to compel most citizens to become docile 
subjects—imposing a curfew, forcibly shearing the hair of “hippies,” torturing political activists, 
searching citizens’ possessions on the street, silencing the voice of leftists in the public arena, 
and so forth. During the dark period of rule by military regimes, Korean citizens were eager to 
have more political rights such as freedom of speech, expression, and assembly, but these were 
repeatedly denied.  
 The times were turbulent: in 1979, South Korea’s first military dictator, Cheong-hee 
Park, was assassinated, and on December 12 of that year General Doo-hwan Chun came to 
power in a military coup. Chun declared nationwide martial law, which was directed at banning 
all political activity, crushing the labor movement, closing the universities, and arresting pro-
democracy politicians and activists, including Dae-jung Kim (Shelley 2001). These actions 
sparked an uprising in Gwangju on May 18, 1980. For the five days of the uprising, the citizens 
of Gwangju held the city: over 200,000 people participated in demonstrations and hundreds of 
civilians in the provincial capitol building (which served as the headquarters for the citizens’ 
army) took up arms against the military regime. During this period, when Gwangju was 
completely blockaded by the military siege and cut off from contact with the outside world, a 
Citizens’ Council was spontaneously organized to defend the city, maintain public security, 
distribute food and water, and prepared to offer armed resistance to the military. On May 22, 
1980, however, the military regime brutally quelled the uprising, massacring as many as 2,000 
people—striking workers, protesting students, and citizens—and took control of Gwangju.1 
Chun then used the demonstrations in Gwangju as a pretext for furthering his repressive policies.  
 
 The Memory of the Gwangju Massacre as an Unhealed Wound 
 The Gwangju uprising is seen as the most tragic event in the history of modern Korea. 
Gwangju is viewed as a shrine of democracy where Koreans remember both the painful history 
of violent repression by the military regime and the first, brief instance of a functioning 
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democracy in Korea. Ironically, since 1993, when Young-sam Kim became Korea’s first 
democratically-elected civilian president, Korean presidents have regarded Gwangju as a 
nuisance. Young-sam Kim made some superficial gestures to memorialize the dead: the 
establishment of a 5/18 Foundation in 1994, a new memorial 5/18 Mangwol-dong Cemetery 
(1997) and other memorial sites, and the Gwangju Uprising Act (1997), which offered some 
compensation to the families of those massacred. Rather than promoting national unity as the 
government intended, however, state-sponsored projects in Gwangju instead revealed the deep 
divisions that remain between Gwangju and the central government. For instance, Yea’s (2002) 
field study of the 5/18 Cemetery demonstrated how the state-sponsored “memorial industry” — 
which arbitrarily relocated the old Mangwol-dong Cemetery and converted the old sites of a 
torture chamber and of a military court into a “5/18 Memorial Park” and a “Remembrance Park” 
— resulted in covering over, rather than healing, the memories that the old sites had preserved. It 
is quite natural that these arbitrary state projects have little historical meaning for the citizens of 
Gwangju. 
 Unlike Young-sam Kim’s clever attempt at political resolution by memorializing the 
uprising, Moo-hyun Noh, during his campaign for the presidency, announced a plan to promote 
Gwangju as “the capital of Asian culture.” Since Noh’s election in April 2003, the government’s 
cultural policies for Gwangju have been repackaged as part of a new urban regeneration project 
with several aims: integrating the local into the global economy; promoting the local economy, 
which has been lagging behind the rest of the country, by means of urban tourism and city 
marketing; and sanitizing the painful past of the city. Noh’s administration began to actively 
implement the Gwangju project through a series of policy initiatives: first there was field 
research to establish Gwangju as the “city of culture” (June through August 2003), followed by 
an official briefing, with President Noh in attendance, announcing Gwangju as “the Cultural 
Capital of Asia” (November 2003), the establishment of a Committee for Planning the City of 
Culture (March 2004), the announcement of open bidding for research projects to regenerate 
Gwangju as Asia’s cultural capital (August 2004), and the official invitation of Gwangju’s 
citizens and artists to a policy briefing about regenerating Gwangju as the cultural capital 
(November 2004).    
A series of neoliberal interventionist cultural policies for Gwangju was also set forth in 
“C-Korea 2010,” a white paper published in 2005 by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. The 
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white paper describes the “C-Korea 2010” vision of a so-called “creative” or cultural national 
economy. It specifies encouraging foreign exports of Korean music, drama, and film, promoting 
Korean entertainers in the Asian entertainment market, and installing international trade fairs or 
film and leisure-sports festivals in major cities that are designated as international cities of 
culture or tourism. This white paper has the ambitious goal of placing regional and local cities in 
the first-tier of the global cultural/creative industry, along with the rapid incorporation of 
national and local development into the global economic system. To realize the state’s vision of 
“development” through the economization of culture, the C-Korea 2010 concretely suggests ten 
major policy goals and, among them, the “Cities of Culture” Project (Chapter 7), and the 
“Establishing Gwangju as the Cultural Capital of Asia” (pp. 62–63) is specified as a primary goal 
for realizing national cultural policy goals.   
While the regeneration of Gwangju aims at reducing Cholla Province’s exclusion from 
the country’s economic growth, the reduction of culture into industry has dominated the 
government’s cultural policy: For urban regeneration in Gwangju, the government has launched 
enormous state projects such as establishment of the Cultural Hall of Asia (through the 
investment of $2 billion: $1billion from national funding,  $50 million from local funding, and 
$50 million from private capital) and of a Multi-Complex for the Culture Industry ($53 million) 
— all to meet the government’s goal of making Gwangju the capital of the culture industry. The 
state-sponsored market initiatives relating to culture and the arts have been the main driver for 
the renewal of Gwangju. Local policymakers have launched initiatives such as hosting 
international arts biennales and culture festivals and promoting tourism to supplement the 
powerful drive of the central government to promote local growth through the culture industry. 
The national and local governments are busily calculating the synergistic effects of these efforts, 
such as creating new employment and increasing market profits from the huge investment in the 
“city of culture” project. In response to the central government’s investment plan, the local 
government has also suggested their own vision, the so-called “Gwangju Vision 2010.” The local 
government’s “Five-year Plan for the Creation of a First-Class Gwangju” corresponds exactly to 
the central government’s investment plan. The city government’s first goal is “to create an 
affluent city by attaining an average per capita income of $14,000” through the “power of 
culture” (Planning & Management Office of Gwangju City 2005). Stimulated by the central 
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government’s investment, the city government has poured frenzied effort into only two goals for 
the city: tourism and the industrialization of culture.    
In a social climate dominated by the central and local government’s logic of economic 
development through the culture industry and competition in the global economy, the historical 
memory of the 1980 uprising in Gwangju has either been effaced or converted into the 
“memorial industry.” In general, during the implementation period of cultural policy from 1993 
to the present, the establishment of a cultural identity in Korea has been evaluated by the 
economic value of the cultural industries (Yim 2002). In fact, the original rhetoric of “the city of 
culture” was questionable from the beginning, when the government, seeking economic 
expansion and an international profile for the city, applied a concept derived from European 
experience.   
  
 The Mirage of the “City of Culture” in Gwangju   
 The state-generated rhetoric aimed at persuading the people of the advantages of the “city 
of culture” project is part of a larger effort throughout the last decade to accelerate the economic 
and cultural globalization of South Korea. The rhetoric of a “New Korea” began gradually 
increasing under the Young-sam Kim government (1993–1997). Kim was the first president to 
popularize the discourses of “internationalization” and “globalization.” The motto of “New 
Korea” aimed to persuade people to voluntarily adopt “a market liberalization policy that was 
required by the ‘globalization’ of capital in order to become a member of the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)” (Kang 2000, p. 451).  
 Since becoming a member country of the OECD, the Korean government has been 
rapidly incorporated into the worldwide intellectual property (IP) system that aims to monopolize 
the new immaterial resources in the new paradigm of the “knowledge-based society” (or 
“creative society”) by means of international IP institutions. Consequently, South Korea became 
a party to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) in 1995, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works in 1996, and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright 
Treaty in March 2004. Between 1957, when the Copyright Act was first enacted in South Korea, 
and 2004, the Act was revised eleven times—with three such revisions occurring since the year 
2000. The trajectory of the Act’s revisions can be summarized in one phrase: “the reinforcement 
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of intellectual property rights” (Hong 2005). The wholesale subordination of the Korean 
government to the international IP system coincides with a shift in policy interest from 
industrialization to the commercialization of cultural expression.  
The rapid affiliation of Korean society with cultural globalization was simultaneous with 
the government’s active interventionist policy for redefining the development of local cities. 
Historically, the initiative for “the city of culture” policy in Korea derived from the “European 
cities of culture” program originated by the Greek Minister of Culture, Melina Mercuri, in 1985. 
The European Commission’s motto is to promote cultural “imagination, innovation, and 
creativity” in European cities, and it designates a new “city of culture” every year with the goal 
of achieving a platform for European networks of artists and institutions. The name was changed 
to the “European Capital of Culture” program in 1999, at which time a new selection procedures 
were adopted to avoid “overly fierce competition to win the accolade”; the EU’s own study saw 
a need to place “increased emphasis on the cultural and European components” in the selection 
process and recommended further changes (Wikipedia 2005a). An “American Capital of 
Culture” program was established by the Organization of American States (OAS), and since 
2000 the so-called “American Capital of Culture Organization” has awarded the title to one or 
more North or South American cities annually. This program also aroused criticism, in this case 
because cities were asked to donate money in order to receive the “honor” (Wikipedia 2005b).  
Ignoring such questions surrounding the “city of culture” programs in Europe and 
America, the Korean government launched a similar program as part of its urban regeneration 
policy. Through a revision of the Act for Urban Planning in 2001, the Minister of Construction 
and Transportation designated some cities as “model cities” in order to promote them for global 
tourism, a policy dominated by the logic of economic development, just as the “cities of culture” 
policy has been. The shift of terminology to “the city of culture” was made when the concrete 
experiment of government investment in Gwangju was launched. Garnham (2005, p. 16) 
describes the “reinforcement of economic language and patterns” within recent policy rhetoric in 
England; similarly, in Korea the shift to the rhetoric of “cities of culture” implies a move from 
marketing and promoting tourism through the idea of “model cities” to the commercialization of 
cultural assets and identities in the “cities of culture.” In a Korea desiring to accomplish in a 
compressed time-frame the creation of a modernity resembling that of wealthier Western 
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societies, the element of indigenous cultural identity is always viewed from within a business 
perspective of “development” and “competition.”  
In sum, the “city of culture” project in Gwangju is a mixture of the neoliberal policy 
approach to culture as an industry and the Korean government’s attempt to consign historical 
memory to oblivion rather than promoting its spirit. The civilian governments’ cultural policies 
have functioned as a political gesture to “buy off” the local residents; rather than curing the 
unhealed memory of the city, they have minimized the historic value of the political uprising and 
human rights. It is no surprise, then, that the policy initiatives for Gwangju manifest such 
undemocratic characteristics as elite-led exhibitionism of urban regeneration, the top-down 
policy-making process, and the market-driven designs of cultural policy.  
 
Regenerating Gwangju as the City of Human Rights 
 Looking at the official website of the City of Gwangju, a visitor sees the five catch-
phrases of “the 21st Century Gwangju Vision”: the “city as an international hub,” the “high-tech 
information city,” the “city of culture and art,” the “ecological city,” and “the city of humanism 
and democracy.” The image of a city that defended peace, human values, and democracy now 
functions as an ancillary ornament to a top-down policy goal of urban regeneration through the 
economic reductionism of culture, rather than as “a vehicle for local representation and 
empowerment” (García 2004, p. 103). The “city of culture” project in Gwangju was born out of a 
confluence of various factors: the current Noh administration’s desire to salve the old wounds of 
the 5/18 uprising (the political factor), a desire to overcome regional separatism and economic 
unevenness (the social factor), and a desire to reconfigure local culture and the arts as economic 
motors within the international market (the economic factor). These top-down and business-
driven policy decisions have made it impossible to hear the real voices of the citizens of 
Gwangju  (the logic of exclusion) and to sustain the historical memory of the 5/18 uprising in the 
face of the rhetorical onslaught of cultural globalization (the logic of oblivion).  
 In the “Symposium on the 20th Anniversary of the Gwangju Uprising,” the critical 
scholar Katsiaficas (2000a; 2000b) evaluated the significance of the 1980 uprising in Gwangju as 
comparable to that of the Paris Commune in French history and of the battleship Potemkin in 
Russian history. Gwangju’s historical significance, he argued, has three dimensions: that of “the 
capacity of self-government,” of “the organic solidarity of the citizens,” and of “the international 
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significance of the uprising.” These three dimensions suggest how the democratic heritage of 
Gwangju should be cultivated through the government’s urban policy. The first and second 
dimensions that Katsiaficas saw in the 1980 uprising, the historical value of “self-government” 
and “solidarity,” should be reflected in the current cultural policies of the national and local 
governments. Currently, public input from below into the huge urban project is almost 
nonexistent: most programs have been implemented from top by elites who enjoy exhibiting 
their performances through constructing a monstrous cultural center or theme park, rather than 
encouraging the spiritual values of a “soft” and “immaterial” heritage through cultural 
participation from below. Katsiaficas’ third dimension — “the international significance of the 
uprising” — is the most important aspect of Gwangju in a global society. Rather than sanitizing 
the memory of the 5/18 uprising, the cultural policy needed is one that will regenerate the city as 
an Asian hub for human rights and democracy in order to renew the heritage of the uprising for 
the present day.  
 A cultural policy aimed at creating a “city of human rights” is not antithetical to the 
economic growth principle of local cities. If the local government allows the active participation 
of the citizens in the decision-making process of cultural projects in the city and if its current 
activities such as sponsoring international festivals, conferences, and art biennales are continued 
on the more democratic basis of encouraging a real sense of historical memory, Gwangju could 
rebuild its image as the preserver of a heritage of pro-democratic political resistance—an image 
that is not enhanced by building larger, prettier cemeteries or by sanitizing the sites of the 
military terror that was perpetrated there.  
 Current urban policy in Gwangju, however, has been greatly conditioned by corporate 
culture, which ignores the importance of social inclusion and the civic participation of 
marginalized community groups that should lie at the heart of urban regeneration. Although 
development of the local economy is central to such a policy agenda, urban policy needs to 
promote the spiritual value of an historic heritage while simultaneously promoting the active 
involvement of underserved and underprivileged local communities. As Mercer (2000) argues, 
integrating sustainable urban development with the concept of “cultural citizenship” enables 
local and regional communities to be defined by the “texture, quality and diversity of the new 
city” (p. 11). UNESCO’s (2005) initiative also situates within local and regional development 
the concerns of “sustainable” development, which aims to promote democratic values such as the 
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diversity of cultural expressions, respect for all cultures, human rights, and the relative 
independence of culture from the industrial approach. Cultural policy programs for sustainable 
development in Gwangju should construct a collaborative network with the initiatives of 
international bodies such as UNESCO, which would perform such roles as cross-national 
mediator, joint funding coordinator, or supporter of cultural research networks. Gwangju’s 
involvement in international initiatives will be a positive step toward protecting its rich cultural 
heritage from the neoliberal attack of market-driven policies. 
 
 
                                                            
NOTE 
1 The role of the US in crushing the Gwangju uprising has never been officially clarified. Since the US government had final 
authority over the US-Korean Allied Forces Command, and thus the Korean government would have had to obtain official 
permission from the US in order to move infantry divisions, airborne units, and special task forces into Gwangju, most Koreans 
believe the US government was indirectly involved in the Gwangju massacre.    
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